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Abstract: 
An integrative conflict analysis approach, incorporating an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
based preference ranking method into the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), is 
employed to investigate the Canadian west coast port congestion dispute. The Canadian west 
coast has historically been an important gateway connecting North America to Asia thanks to its 
specific geographical and strategic location. Despite successful operations and maintenance of the 
port facilities to handle international trade during the past few decades, the west coast is now 
facing increasing congestion problems, resulting in significant delays in transporting goods from 
the west coast to other parts of Canada and the USA. The strategic analyses carried out in this 
research suggest potential resolutions in which Canada would expand port facilities at various 
locations, encouraging traders to continue choosing the Canadian west coast as one of their trade 
gateways to North America. 
Keywords: AHP, integrative conflict analysis, graph model, Canadian west coast port congestion, 
preference 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Traffic congestions always have significant impacts on the entire supply chain 
operations. Currently, the Canadian west coast is facing increasing congestion problems 
caused by the recent explosive increase in the trading volume with Asia, especially China. 
This serious congestion results in considerable delays in receiving goods from other 
countries and transporting goods from the west coast to other parts of Canada and the 
USA.   
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Generally, the west coast of Canada refers to British Columbia (BC), the westernmost 
Canadian province. As the key connection point in the Asia-Pacific Gateway, the BC port 
system has always been and will continue to be the most critical aspect of the economic 
future of Canada, and perhaps even the entire North American continent. Nevertheless, 
the recent booming trade between Asian countries and North America has brought 
serious concerns to all Canadian west coast ports. The Port of Vancouver (it was merged 
with Fraser River Port and North Fraser Port into a large entity known as Port Metro 
Vancouver  now), Canada’s largest and most diversified port, for example, is already 
handling a significantly large container business of 1,767,379 TEUs (20-foot-equivalent 
units) in 2005, which is forecasted to be tripled within 15 years (Ryan, 2006a). But the 
existing port capacity cannot handle such a massive amount. By 2020, the container 
cargo going through British Columbian ports and the value of this trade are projected to 
expand to 5 to 7 million containers and $75 billion, thereby increasing by about 300% 
and 114%, respectively (Transport Canada, 2005). Some statistical data provide further 
description of this situation: the world gross domestic product in the past twenty years 
has increased 2.8% annually; global container trade has increased about 9% annually; 
more than 140 jumbo containerships of 8,000 to 10,000 TEUs capacity will be sailing on 
the world’s oceans within five years. These capacity crises, due to exponentially 
increasing trade, are faced by all Canadian ports and generate immense pressure on 
Canadian transportation systems. Norman Stark, President and CEO of TSI Terminal 
Systems, put forward the following five issues in September 2005, when attending the 
annual Port Days Conference (Smyrlis, 2005): 1) congested terminals; 2) shortage of 
longshore labour; 3) strained road and rail infrastructure; 4) scarcity of land for port 
expansions; and 5) increasing investment costs. Each issue poses a real challenge to 
Canada. 
Meanwhile, the US ports are also experiencing a serious congestion situation. The huge 
amounts of international trading are “straining the supporting infrastructure” and 
significantly delaying all activities within supply chains (Sowinski, 2007). Pennsylvania 
State University recently studied 24 major US and Canadian ports and stated that west 
coast ports are underestimating expected future container volumes by as much as 11 
million TEUs in 2015. “Delays due to congestion at west coast ports could then cause a 
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domino effect” (Ryan, 2006a). More specifically, Seattle, for instance, is the fastest-
growing port in North America. From 2004 to 2005, its box volume has risen by 18% to 
more than 2 million TEUs. In response to the volume growth, Seattle expects to increase 
its processing capacity by 10% after a new terminal project is completed by 2008 (Ryan, 
2006a). In fact, this type of growth will continue well into the future. Such expansions are 
taking place in other locations along the US west coast, such as Los Angeles and San 
Diego, as well as some east coast ports. Nevertheless, the expanded capacity still does not 
seem to be able to keep pace with the rapid growth of international trade. 
Facing all these challenges, Canadians have also come to realize some opportunities. 
As Stephen Poloz, Senior Vice-president, Corporate Affairs and Chief Economist of the 
Export Development Corporation (EDC) indicated (Ryan, 2006b), “Over the next five 
years, port capacity in Asia is slated to double. But in the United States, a lot of 
investments (since 9/11) are being funnelled into security rather than capacity.” 
Accordingly, it is possible for Canadian ports to act as “a facilitator of US trade”，not 
only because Canada is geographically located closest to Europe and Asia among the 
three countries involved in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but 
also due to Canada’s lowest administrative burden (Brooks, 2007). Therefore, a key 
purpose of this paper is to suggest how Canada can seek opportunities for maximizing its 
benefit from this role. 
Port research has been conducted from many different methodological viewpoints 
(Woo et al, 2011). Distinct from previous literature, this work focuses on the strategic 
perspective, aiming to develop an integrative conflict analysis approach (Ke et al., 2007), 
which incorporates an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Satty, 1980, 1982, 1995, 2001; 
Chang et al., 2007) based preference ranking method into the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution (GMCR) (Fang et al., 1993), to examine the Canadian west coast port 
congestion problem. GMCR is a systematic procedure that handles complicated strategic 
decision problems involving two or more decision-makers (DMs) with differing 
objectives as reflected by their diverse preferences over possible states or outcomes. Due 
to its simplicity and flexibility, the graph model enables interested parties or an analyst to 
analyze a conflict and obtain a better understanding about what is currently happening 
and what could eventually take place (Fang et al., 1993). At the modeling stage, the 
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determination of relative preferences for each DM is one of the most important elements 
as each involved party usually has different preferences over options, situations, and/or 
states; and a compromise or consensus, if any, will be achieved according to these 
preferences. From each DM’s standpoint, it is inevitably appealing to consider multiple 
criteria when preferences are ranked over feasible states. If each state is regarded as a 
decision alternative in the ranking process, preference elicitation can be naturally treated 
as a typical Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) problem. As a useful MCDA 
technique, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 1995, 2001) 
provides a mathematical procedure to take both quantitative and qualitative criteria into 
consideration in ranking decision alternatives. In this paper, the AHP approach is adapted 
to elicit preference rankings for each DM, which are then fed into a decision support 
system (DSS), GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b), to carry out a standard graph model 
stability analysis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, the basic 
methodology utilized in the application is described. Section III develops the conflict 
model for the Canadian west coast congestion problem and explains the preference 
derivation procedure from the AHP method. Section IV furnishes useful structural 
insights garnered from the strategic analysis. The paper concludes with some remarks in 
Section V.  
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODOLOGY 
In this section, basics are first introduced about the graph model and its associated 
DSS, GMCR II. Then, the AHP approach is briefly explained with a focus on its 
structural features and practical procedures for utilizing the approach to derive preference 
information that will be incorporated into the graph model for carrying out the strategic 
analysis. 
2.1. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is a simple but flexible methodology that is 
designed to analyze conflicts arising from a wide range of areas, such as environmental 
management, labour-management negotiations, military strategies, and peace-keeping 
activities, to name a few (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). The graph model allows interested 
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parties to put complicated strategic decision problems into perspective and attain a better 
understanding about the current situation as well as envisioning potential resolutions 
(Fang et al., 1993). In this section, a brief introduction is provided for the graph model 
and its associated DSS, GMCR II. 
GMCR has its root in game theory and takes advantage of a graph representation to 
characterize DMs’ moves and countermoves in a conflict. This methodology  consists of 
four basic components (Fang et al., 1993): 1) a set of DMs,  1,2,...,N n ; 2) a set of 
nodes,  1 2, ,..., mS s s s , where each node represents a feasible state describing a 
distinguishable scenario of the conflict; 3) a collection of finite directed graphs 
 ( , ),i iD S A i N   to track unilateral moves for each DM i, where iD  is the directed graph 
for DM i and iA  is DM i's set of directed arcs in iD , for which each arc stands for a move 
DM i can make in one step between two states; and 4) each DM’s relative preferences 
over S. 
Note that, although all DMs share the same set of states, their rankings of the states 
according to preference usually differ due to their divergent interests. For a certain DM i, 
the relative preferences over the set of states, S, can be represented by binary relations 
{ i , ~i } on S, where for any two states s  and q , is q  indicates that DM i strictly 
prefers s over q, and s ~i q indicates that DM i equally prefers s and q. This pair of binary 
relations constitutes a preference structure with the following properties: 
1) i  is asymmetric, i.e., it cannot occur that both is q  and iq s ; 
2) ~i  is reflexive and symmetric, i.e., s ~i s and if s ~i q, then q ~i s; and 
3) { i , ~i} is strongly complete, i.e., one and only one of the following three 
relations holds true: is q , iq s , or s ~i q. 
When DMs’ moves and countermoves are assessed, it is reasonable to assume that each 
DM can only move from one state to another unilaterally, where the other DMs’ actions 
are fixed. When he or she prefers to stay at a state, or in other words, does not have the 
motivation to move away from this state unilaterally, this state is said to be stable for the 
given DM. An equilibrium is obtained when a state is stable for all DMs under a certain 
stability definition, referred to as a solution concept. A predicted equilibrium usually 
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corresponds to a potential resolution for this conflict model (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour et 
al., 1996; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).  
In the graph model, several distinct solution concepts are employed to define stability, 
thereby capturing DMs’ different behavioural and decision patterns in the face of 
conflict. The main stability definitions currently considered by GMCR include Nash 
Stability (Nash), General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), 
Sequential Stability (SEQ), Limited Move Stablity (Lh), and Non-Myopic Stability (NM). 
Table 1 shows a list of these solution concepts with their descriptions and associated 
characteristics. As an important feature, foresight refers to a DM’s capacity to foresee 
possible future moves under a particular stability definition. As shown in Table 1, Nash 
stability has the lowest foresight, while non-myopic stability has the highest. The 
strategic disimprovement in the next column means a DM may move to a less preferred 
state temporarily in order to reach a more preferred one eventually. The disimprovement 
by opponents means that other DMs may choose to move to a less preferred state in order 
to block the focal DM’s unilateral improvements. For mathematical definitions, 
references, and other details, see Fang et al. (1993). 
Table 1 is about here 
 
To determine the stability and equilibrium status of a state, significant calculations are 
needed. Without an efficient decision support system, it would be extremely hard to carry 
out a stability analysis of any conflict model. To alleviate the calculation burden and 
enhance the applicability of the graph model methodology, the DSS, GMCR II, is 
designed to operationalise the aforesaid solution concepts and permits the calibration and 
stability analysis of conflict models (Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b). GMCR II furnishes a 
friendly user interface, requires minimal input, and completes calculations as well as 
analyses in an expeditious manner. This DSS can be beneficially applied to three main 
situations listed as follows (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). 
1) Analysis and simulation tool for conflict participants: GMCR II can be used in 
simulation or role-playing exercises that aim to achieve a better understanding or 
prediction of real world conflicts.  
 7
2) Analysis and communication tool for mediators: GMCR II can be utilized by 
mediators to reconcile opposing viewpoints, create a more harmonious atmosphere in 
which to carry out negotiations, and assist in conducting and settling a dispute more 
effectively.  
3) Analysis tool for a third party or a regulator: GMCR II can be used by other 
interested parties, such as representatives of a third party or a regulator, as a helpful 
mechanism to understand the conflict and perhaps seek fact-binding or legal-binding 
rules.  
2.2. The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Incorporating not only quantitative but also qualitative criteria during a decision-
making process, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 1995, 2001) 
is an effective multicriteria decision making technique that allows a DM to structure his 
or her decisions hierarchically and accommodates his or her personal experience, logical 
judgement, and even individual imaginations in the decision-making process. This 
technique has been broadly applied to many different aspects of problems areas (Vidal et 
al., 2010; Sadeghi-Niaraki et al., 2011; Yu et al., 2011). A review of the applications and 
methodological developments of AHP can be found in Ishizaka and Labib (2011). 
The major idea underlying AHP is to streamline complex decision problems by 
breaking them down into hierarchies with fundamental elements. Usually, a typical 
hierarchy includes 1) a focus level, specifying the overall objective of the decision 
problem; 2) a criteria level, also called a factor level, identifying all important criteria; 3) 
a sub-criteria level, used in some complicated situations in order to provide more detailed 
insights of certain criteria (for extremely complex cases, there may exist several sub-
criteria levels); and 4) an alternative level, listing possible alternatives. Figure 1 
illustrates such a typical hierarchy. 
Figure 1 is about here 
 
Next, pairwise comparison matrices are constructed for each criterion (factor) at the 
same level. The matrices contain the relative priorities of elements. Note that at different 
levels, these elements represent different objects: criteria, sub-criteria, or alternatives. For 
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example, for a certain criterion (or sub-criterion) X with t elements below it: 1 2, ,..., tY Y Y , 
a pairwise comparison matrix can be made as illustrated in Table 2.  In this matrix, ijy  
provides the pairwise comparison result of elements iY  and jY  with respect to element X.  
Therefore, it is natural to have: 1) 11 22 ... 1tty y y    ; and 2) 1/ij jiy y ( , 1,2,...,i j t ). 
Table 2 is about here 
 
In AHP, a scale of “1” to “9” is adopted to conduct non-quantitative pairwise 
comparisons of two elements (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 1995, 2001). In this scale system, “1” 
indicates equal importance of two elements contributing to the upper level property, “9” 
means absolute importance of one element over another, and a value between “1” and “9” 
provides an in-between importance measurement of one element over another. For 
detailed descriptions of the 9-scale measurement system, see Saaty (1980, 1982, 1995, 
2001). In the last decade, many concerns, such as weakness in the symmetry of negative 
and positive knowledge perception, have been raised about this 9-scale system. Therefore, 
alternative scale systems have been developed (Ma and Zheng, 1991, Donegan et al., 
1992). In this paper, priority calculations are first carried out with the traditional 9-scale 
system, and, then, verified with two popular alternative scales (Beynon, 2002). The 
sensitivity analysis results are discussed in Section IV.C. 
After the establishment of the pairwise comparison matrices, a so-called eigenvalue 
technique is employed to calculate the weights of overall relative priorities for each 
element. The consistency of the comparison matrices is tracked by a Consistency Ratio 
(CR). According to Saaty (1995), the consistency ratio should be less than 5%, 8%, and 
10% for a 3×3 matrix, a 4×4 matrix, and matrices of higher orders, respectively. Finally, 
by employing a linear additive aggregation procedure, the global priority of each element 
relative to the overall objective is derived based on all the weights generated in the 
previous procedure.  
2.3. The Integrated Approach 
This paper integrates an AHP based preference elicitation approach into a graph model. 
Figure 2 provides a simple comparison between the adapted version and the standard 
AHP approach. As can be seen in Figure 2(b), the overall purpose is to obtain the 
 9
preference ranking of each DM whereby the feasible states are ordered from most to least 
preferred with ties being allowed. Instead of Criteria, this approach takes the DMs’ 
influence powers into consideration. The powers then affect each DM’s preference 
ranking. 
Figure 2 is about here 
 
More specifically, the structure of the adapted AHP approach is depicted in Figure 3. 
Detailed explanations are given next for the four hierarchies in this structure. 
1) The Preference Ranking level contains all DMs considered in the conflict model. 
Instead of only one objective as in the standard AHP approach, this level specifies that 
the objectives are to obtain preference rankings for all DMs. Then, the preference 
analysis contained in the following steps is carried out from each DM’s viewpoint 
separately.  
2) The influence power level furnishes different DMs’ influence powers over the 
entire situation from each DM’s standpoint. By the same pairwise matrix and eigenvalue 
technique as the traditional AHP, a weight list is obtained to illustrate the power strength 
for all DMs based on a certain DM’s assessment. 
3) The option level lists all options under each DM’s control. At this level, priority 
weights of all options will be obtained. Moreover, comparisons can be further 
decomposed into a sub-hierarchy model if the complexity of the problem warrants. 
4) The actions/states level displays a series of action profiles, characterized by 
combinations of “0” and “1” against the options, where a “0” indicates a corresponding 
option is not chosen and a “1” stands for the option being selected. The overall 
preference ranking is thus determined by multiplying option priority weights and action 
status. After all DMs’ relative preferences are elicited, they are then fed into GMCR II 
for further stability analyses. 
Figure 3 is about here 
 
Next, our strategic analysis of the port congestion problem in Western Canada aims to 
provide structural insights into this important issue from a third-party perspective. The 
analytical results indicate that it would be beneficial for regulators to make strategic 
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investment in expanding port capacities and for relevant stakeholders to lobby 
government agencies for a better resolution. To conduct this analysis, the graph model 
methodology helps to put the problem into perspective, the AHP approach is employed to 
elicit preference rankings for each DM, and the DSS GMCR II allows for expeditious 
calculations of stability and equilibrium under diverse solution concepts as described in 
Section II.A and listed in Table 1. 
3. MODELING THE CANADIAN WEST COAST PORT CONGESTION CONFLICT 
In this section, a graph model is established to investigate the Canadian west coast port 
congestion problem. Subsequently, the proposed AHP structure is used to derive the 
relative preference input for the conflict model.  
3.1. Model Description 
The point in time that was selected for modeling the conflict is the beginning of October 
2006. Four DMs are considered in this model: Canadian government (CA), United States 
government (US), Chinese government (CN), and Traders (TD). DMs and their 
corresponding options are listed in Table 3. As the graph model is designed to handle 
conflict situations at a strategic level, the choices listed below are given as general 
options. By substituting a general option into a set of more specific options, one could 
carry out a more detailed strategic analysis. However, the added complexity may not 
improve the clarity of the strategic insights that can be garnered. For a lower operational 
level analysis of the issue, the overall scope of the problem has to be further restricted 
and different methodologies (e.g., cost-benefit analysis) have to be entertained so that 
meaningful trade-offs can be examined. 
Table 3 is about here 
As mentioned in the introduction section, this research aims to assist the Canadian 
government to solve the congestion problem and take advantage of opportunities from the 
situation. Hence, CA’s decisions are the focal point here. The three options for CA are to 
expand the capacities in Port of Prince Rupert, Port Metro Vancouver, or the other ports 
(east coast ports such as Port of Montreal and Port of Halifax). As the key strategic 
companion of CA, US has relied on Canadian west coast ports for a long time, and would 
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like to continue utilizing these Canadian ports to ease its own transportation congestion. 
Furthermore, this model considers mainly the impacts of US’s actions on CA. No matter 
which US ports are expanded, the results conceived by CA are the same. Therefore, the 
options for US are simplified to two: carrying out expansion plans on US ports or seeking 
other solutions. China is selected to be the representative for all fast-growing Asian 
trading partners, as China has now become one of the world’s biggest economies due to 
its efficient labour costs. In addition to the Canadian and the US ports, CN is considering 
taking its own initiative to build a superport in Mexico. As one of the DMs, Traders refer 
to all shippers involved in this problem, such as manufacturers, exporters, importers, 
carriers, and third-party logistics providers. The options of TD are to choose which 
gateway to use for their current and future trade to North America. A more detailed 
discussion of these options is furnished later when preference elicitation is considered in 
Section III.C. 
3.2. Generation of Feasible States 
Except for China, which has only one option under its control, each DM has to choose 
at least one option: Canada has to expand its port capacities in one or more locations in 
response to the rising container volume; the US has to choose at least one of its options, 
expanding its own port capacity, finding other solutions to relieve the bottleneck situation, 
or both; and Traders have to select at least one of their options. 
As for the “Option dependence” method embedded in GMCR II, Traders would like to 
choose US as the gateway only when US expands its own ports, to select CA as the 
gateway when Canada addresses its expansion plan in one of its three options, and to 
choose Mexico as the gateway unless China builds its own superport there. By using the 
foregoing techniques in GMCR II to remove infeasible patterns, 105 feasible states are 
retained out of 512 (or 29) mathematically possible states. 
3.3. Preference Ranking by the Modified AHP Approach 
Based on the list of DMs and options in Table 3, a hierarchy structure of this conflict 
model is given in Figure 4, which is employed to elicit relative preference rankings for 
each DM as explained below. Note that the consistencies of all calculations are confirmed 
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using the guidelines in Saaty (1995) and discussed further with alternative scale systems 
at the end of Section IV. 
Figure 4 is about here 
 
1) Canada’s standpoint 
From Canada’s standpoint, US is the most powerful DM, followed by Canada, then 
China, and with Traders exerting the least control over the situation. Accordingly, the 
pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers is formed as shown in Table 4 along 
with the ranking result (weights).  
Table 4 is about here 
 
At the option level, the expansion of the Port Metro Vancouver is definitely the first 
choice for Canada as Vancouver is Canada’s flagship port and the most diversified port 
on the continent. As a matter of fact, Vancouver had planned to construct a third berth at 
Deltaport at Roberts Bank to increase its capacity by 400,000 TEUs to 1.3 million TEUs. 
But the federal government recently delayed this construction and requested more 
environmental impact studies (Ryan, 2006a).  
Due to the strategic location and potential to offer efficient access to the North 
American market, the Port of Prince Rupert becomes another alternative. In fact, the 
Government of Canada already had the intent to build a container terminal there 
(Government of Canada, 2005). Some extra special features of the Port of Prince Rupert 
attract more attention from different parties. For example, its deep natural harbour 
provides the possibility of handling jumbo containerships; sailing times from Prince 
Rupert to China’s main ports are about 24 to 60 hours shorter than from other west coast 
ports (Ryan, 2005); it has the safest west coast harbour with extensive capacity to expand 
(Port of Prince Rupert Authority, 2006). However, this alternative also faces many 
obstacles. The main issues include: 1) Remoteness of the location: Prince Rupert is about 
500 miles north of Vancouver; 2) Lack of infrastructure: The Canadian National Railway 
(CNR) provides the only land connection to the port; 3) Aboriginal issues: A tribal group 
has threatened to file lawsuits to stop the progress of the port expansion plan due to the 
violation of aboriginal land rights; 4) Some shipping lines are reluctant to add this port 
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into their shipping routes because of additional piloting costs (Machalaba, 2006; Ryan, 
2006a). 
Besides these two west coast ports, other Canadian ports have also gained prominence 
recently. It is known that the Ports of Montreal and Halifax have started to handle 
significant container businesses originating from the US Midwest. Furthermore, their 
geographic locations and existing surplus capacities provide them with competitive 
advantages over other alternatives (Ryan, 2006b).  
With respect to the US’s options, it does not really matter for Canada if US chooses to 
expand its own ports or finds some other solutions for the congestion problem. When it 
comes to Traders’ options, the most important concern for Canada is that they select 
Canada as one of their trading gateways. The other two choices, US and Mexico 
gateways, are much less preferred and do not make much difference for Canada. The 
pairwise comparison matrices for all these options for each DM are then constructed, and 
the ranking weights are also calculated as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 is about here 
2) US’s standpoint  
Table 6 provides the pairwise comparison matrix and ranking results for influence 
power from US’s viewpoint. US thinks of itself as the most powerful DM, China as 
slightly more powerful than Canada due to its rapid growth and its increasing impacts on 
the world trade, and Canada as somewhat more powerful than the Traders.  
Table 6 is about here 
 
At the option level for the US, the Port of Prince Rupert is the most preferred, followed 
by the Port Metro Vancouver, and then other ports. Although the Port of Prince Rupert is 
remotely located in Northern BC, the railway system provides a direct link to Chicago 
with very few stops on the way. Therefore, the rail-transit time is likely about the same as 
the land route from Los Angeles to Chicago, even with a longer distance (Machalaba, 
2006). By squeezing out unnecessary delays at other crowded ports, the entire 
transportation time from China to the US Midwest could possibly be reduced from 35-40 
days to only about 20 days if the route via the Port of Prince Rupert is taken (Pitts, 2006). 
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In order to capture the booming Asian trade, US has to expand its own ports, especially 
its west coast ports, such as Los Angeles-Long Beach ports and Seattle-Tacoma ports, 
which handled more than 87 percent of the west coast’s container volume in 2006 
(Sowinski, 2007). However, due to the extremely expensive investment of expansion, 
some other approaches have been entertained. For instance, since 2005, the Ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach have been growing their PierPass Offpeak gates to shift cargo 
operations to off-peak hours in order to alleviate serious congestions at the ports, on the 
freeway, and in the neighbouring communities. This program now handles about 55% of 
all container traffic volume at these two ports without incurring significant investment 
into port infrastructures [PierPass.org, 2011].  
As for the options of Traders, US most prefers that they choose US as the gateway so it 
can capture more profits than Canada. Mexico would be the last choice due to the lack of 
supporting infrastructure, particularly transportation systems. The pairwise comparison 
and ranking results for each DM’s options from the US perspective are thus determined 
and illustrated in Table 7. 
Table 7 is about here 
3) China’s standpoint 
The Chinese government thinks the order of DMs’ influence power from most to least 
is US, China, Canada, and Traders (Table 8). 
Table 8 is about here 
 
From the point of view of the Chinese government for Canadian ports, the Port of 
Prince Rupert, due to its shortest distance to Asia and future expansion potentials, 
naturally becomes the best alternative. Port Metro Vancouver would be the second choice 
because of its existing container capacity and handling experience. In addition, some east 
coast ports, such as Halifax, also gain attention from China for the possibility of 
bypassing congestion on the west coast. For China, whatever US does, either expanding 
ports or exploring other methods, does not make any difference, as long as the serious 
bottleneck situation can be lessened so that their goods could be transported to their 
destinations instead of simply being piled up on the west coast. Building their own deep-
water superport in Mexico is another potential resolution for China (Pitts, 2006). 
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Therefore, the relative preference rankings for each DM’s options from China’s 
viewpoint are derived as shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 is about here 
 
4) Traders’ standpoint 
From Traders’ standpoint, US, again, is the most powerful party, followed by Canada 
and themselves. China is the least powerful party (Table 10). 
Table 10 is about here 
 
For Traders, any port that can handle their goods would be attractive. As their goods 
shipped to US west coast ports are being piled higher and higher, Canadian ports are 
definitely good choices, especially the Port of Prince Rupert. Furthermore, for the reason 
of capacity surplus, some Canadian east coast ports gain more attention from different 
Traders than the Port Metro Vancouver. Again, to the extent that the west coast 
congestion problem is concerned, the two options controlled by US do not make any 
difference for Traders. Moreover, since US already has a much more developed 
infrastructure system than Mexico, it is a better gateway choice than Mexico, unless 
China develops its own deep-water superports in Mexico (Pitts, 2006). The pairwise 
comparison matrices and the corresponding weights for each DM’s options from Traders’ 
standpoint can hence be obtained as illustrated in Table 11. 
Table 11 is about here 
 
5) Overall ranking 
By aggregating results obtained from each individual DM’s perspective, the overall 
ranking weights are as listed in Table 12. As mentioned above, the weights for the 
Actions/States level are calculated by multiplying the related influence power by the 
option weight. For example, the Action/State weight for Canada choosing to expand the 
Port of Prince Rupert is 0.204 0.268 0.054672 0.055   .  
Table 12 is about here 
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Now, all feasible states are treated as 105 alternatives and ranked accordingly in the 
AHP framework from each DM’s perspective. Taking one of the predicted equilibria in 
Table 13, state 84, as an example, the preference value for CA can be computed as 
1 0.055 1 0.125   1 0.024 0 0.331    1 0.331 1 0.084    0 0.006 1 0.039     
1 0.006 0.664   . From these numerical preference values, one can derive the ordinal 
preference ranking for each DM. The preference information is then input into the 
GMCR II analysis engine to conduct stability analyses, which provide a wide range of 
individual stability and equilibrium information for each state under different solution 
concepts.  
4. ANALYTICAL RESULTS: STRUCTURAL INSIGHTS AND INTERPRETATION  
4.1. Predicted Resolutions 
Given the preference profiles generated in Section III, GMCR II examines all of the six 
stabilities for each feasible state. Among the 105 feasible states, only states 84 and 98 are 
predicted to be stable for all DMs under Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ, and certain limited-
move stability as given in Table 1 in Section II.A. These two states are thus referred to as 
the predicted strong equilibria, or possible resolutions (Table 13). In Table 13, a “1” 
indicates that the option is chosen by the DM controlling this option, and a “0” means 
that the corresponding option is not selected. Different combinations of “1’s” and “0’s” 
illustrate DMs’ diverse choices in the corresponding states. Generally speaking, the more 
solution concepts under which a state is predicted to be equilibrium, the more likely this 
state may actually turn out to be a resolution in reality. As the solution concepts GMR 
and SMR are only applicable to very conservative focal DMs, they tend to predict many 
stable states, resulting in a large number of equilibria (Fang et al. 1993). As such, our 
following analysis and interpretation are restricted to the two strong equilibria, states 84 
and 98, which are more likely to occur in reality. For these two equilibria, there exist 
three distinct commonalities: 1) Canada performs expansion plans in all of its three 
options; 2) China builds its superport in Mexico; and 3) Traders continue choosing 
Canada as one of their trade gateways.  
Table 13 is about here 
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In Canada’s case, this is exactly what happened after the point in time for which this 
model was built. On October 11, 2006, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
announced the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative (APGCI), with an initial 
investment of $591 million over the next eight years on ports, roads, rails and other 
infrastructure to improve trading access to Asia-Pacific markets (Pacific Gateway 
Updates, 2009a). In order to further smooth the flow of international trade through 
Canada’s west coast, an additional $233.5 million “Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor 
Transportation Infrastructure Fund” is promised to improve the road and rail connections 
(Prince Rupert Port Authority, 2006, Brooks, 2007). The 2007 Canadian Budget included 
a further commitment of $410 million, which brings the total federal funding for APGCI 
to more than $1 billion (Pacific Gateway Updates, 2009a). On June 1, 2007, in a speech 
to the 70th annual conference on the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the Prime 
Minister announced a $33-billion infrastructure funding plan, among which one of the 
most critical projects is “the Asia-Pacific gateway and Corridor Initiative to bring Canada 
into the booming Far East through the West Coast ports” (Office of the Prime Minister, 
2007). In October 2007, the Speech from the Throne further confirmed an infrastructure 
program, the Building Canada Plan, to support Canada’s long-term growth by investing 
in the transport and trade hubs (Government of Canada, 2007). Moreover, the 
Government of Canada and Province of British Columbia have also been working with 
public and private sector agencies “to advance various initiatives to improve 
infrastructure, labour and service reliability of the Pacific Gateway” (Pacific Gateway 
Updates, 2009b). By March 2009, a total value of $15 million had been invested by the 
partners in the Pacific Gateway (Pacific Gateway Updates, 2009a).  
In January 2010, a new shipping berth was opened at Deltaport, Canada’s largest 
container terminal. The capacity of the Port Metro Vancouver facility was increased by 
50% because of this new berth (Canada’s Pacific Gateway, 2010). In September 2010, 
the Government of Canada announced an investment of $2.5 million in the Prince Rupert 
Port Authority’s Fairview Terminal project to provide shore power capacity to container 
ships. This project will enable Prince Rupert to be the first Canadian port to offer shore 
power for container ships (The Government of Canada, 2010). As of the year 2010, on 
the east coast of Canada, the Halifax Port Authority had invested $100 million during the 
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previous five years, and planned to invest over $225 million over the next five years. The 
private sector also invested over $250 million in port-related infrastructure up until 2010 
(Halifax Port Authority, 2010).  
In the meantime, China has been working actively to open and develop NAFTA 
shipping ports in Mexico. This will allow products to be transported across the Pacific 
Ocean between China and Mexico at the ports of Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas, and 
then to service the North American market through San Antonio, Texas (Corsi, 2006). 
4.2. Status Quo Analysis 
As one of the important analysis tools in GMCR, status quo analysis is used to address 
the dynamic dimension of the conflict and provides insights into the evolution of the 
conflict over time. Basically, this analysis tracks the moves of the problem from the 
starting point of the conflict, passing through transitional states, and finally reaching the 
equilibrium (Li et al., 2005). 
Table 14 shows the state transition from the status quo state to equilibrium 98. Note 
that the arrows in the table indicate moves made by the corresponding DMs. At the status 
quo, the US has started to seek possible ways of dealing with the serious congestion 
problem, and Traders are now choosing US and CA as their trading gateway. Then, CA 
makes the first move by investing in the expansion plan in all of its three options. Next, 
seeing that CA is making relentless efforts to improve the situation, US decides to 
continue its own expansion plan and drops the other option under its control. 
Subsequently, CN still thinks a superport in Mexico is to its benefit and decides to act on 
this plan, and thus, TD adds this superport as one of their gateways in addition to the 
other two existing choices.  
Table 14 is about here 
4.3. Sensitivity Analyses 
In a sensitivity analysis, one makes meaningful changes in one or more of the model 
parameters to ascertain how this affects the final results. For example, in a conflict 
analysis investigation, an analyst may wish to determine if sensible alterations to the 
preferences of one or more of the DMs changes the final equilibria. If the equilibria 
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remain essentially the same, then the strategic findings are said to be robust with respect 
to the preference changes. In many conflict studies, uncertainty in preference information 
indicates what specific sensitivity analyses should be executed. A main advantage of the 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is that one can immediately ascertain the strategic 
impacts of these preference changes.  
Consider now the case study being addressed in this paper. Because preference 
information used in the AHP analysis was obtained from the published literature and the 
authors’ understanding of the dispute, there is some uncertainty present. Accordingly, 
two sensitivity analyses are carried out using sensible changes in the judgement matrices. 
Specifically, the first sensitivity analysis examines the uncertainty in judgement matrices 
by varying their pairwise comparison entries, and the other one explores two alternative 
scale systems to Saaty’s original 1-9 scales.  
1)  Sensitivity Analysis on Pairwise Judgement Matrices 
As an example, the pairwise judgement matrix for influence powers from Canada’s 
standpoint in Table 4 has been exhaustively examined by varying the CA-CN entry from 
2 to 4, the CA-TD entry from 4 to 6, US-CA entry from 4 to 6, US-CN from 6-8, US-TD 
from 8 to 9, and CN-TD from 1 to 3 (with remaining entries being set up as the reciprocal 
values of the corresponding entries, e.g., if 3,ijy   then 1/ 3jiy  ). This extensive 
examination portrays a reasonable picture of how the uncertainty in judgement matrices 
may affect the DMs’ preference rankings and the resulting equilibria. Computational 
results indicate that when the preference information is changed, the predicted strong 
equilibria remain as states 84 and 98 as given in Table 13. Hence, the equilibria are 
robust or resilient with respect to these judgement matrix changes. 
2)  Sensitivity Analysis on Scale Systems 
As outlined by Saaty (1995), consistency ratios should be less than 5%, 8%, and 10% 
for 3×3 , 4×4, and higher-order matrices, respectively. For all of the pairwise matrices 
presented earlier (Tables 4-11), Saaty’s original 1-9 scale system is employed. Analytical 
results confirm that most of the consistency ratios satisfy these requirements except for 
two 3×3 matrices (Tables 5.a and 7.a), which yield a consistency ratio of 0.07.  
Accordingly, two alternative scales discussed by Beynon (2002) were employed for 
executing a sensitivity analysis. Beynon (2002) indicates that the original 1-9 scale may 
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exhibit weakness in the presence of the symmetry of negative and positive knowledge 
perception, whereas alternative scales offer certain benefits in this case. Therefore, 
preference priorities are re-calculated using the following two suggested alternative 
scales: 
1) ‘9/9-9/1’ scales (Ma and Zheng, 1991), namely  9 / 10 k , with 1,...,9k  . 
2)   mapping (Donegan et al., 1992), where the relevant scales satisfy 
1 1: exp tanh
9
kk          , with 1,...,9k  . 
With these two new scales, all consistency ratios are effectively controlled within the 
threshold of 0.05. Recalculations with these alternative scale systems result in nearly 
identical state rankings (preferences), and the final strong equilibria remain the same as 
the original analysis.  
Hence, these sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of the strategic findings and 
validate the structural insights obtained from our investigation.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the Canadian west coast port congestion problem is analyzed from a 
conflict-analysis perspective. During the past few decades, the number of containers 
being transported to or from west coast ports has been boosted extensively. Amidst a 
period of booming economics, this situation of congestion is not only a challenging 
problem, but also a significant opportunity for Canada. This study aims to assist the 
Canadian government in seeking possible ways to ease the congestion and to maximize 
benefits.  
In addition to the Canadian government, the options and preferences of the US 
government, the Chinese government, and traders are all considered.  The AHP approach 
is adapted to elicit preferences for each DM, and the preference rankings are then fed into 
the conflict model within the framework of a DSS, GMCR II, for further stability analysis. 
This research sheds strategic insights into the conflict under consideration. Practically, 
the analysis suggests potential resolutions where DMs would take their own actions to 
deal with the situation:  Canada would expand its port facilities on the west coast, China 
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would build its superport in Mexico, and traders would then continue to select Canadian 
west coast ports for trading purposes.  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. A sample hierarchy 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of the standard and adapted AHP. 
 
Figure 3. The structure of the adapted AHP approach 
 
Figure 4. An adapted AHP model for eliciting preferences for the west coast congestion 
problem. 
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Table 1. Stability definitions and human behaviour (Adapted from Fang et al., 1993) 
Definition Description Foresight Disimprovements 
Nash stability (Nash) If a DM cannot unilaterally move to a more 
preferred state. Low Never 
General 
metarationality 
(GMR) 
If all of a DM’s unilateral improvements are 
sanctioned by its opponents’ subsequent unilateral 
moves. 
Medium 
By opponents Symmetric 
metarationality (SMR) 
If all of a DM’s unilateral improvements are still 
sanctioned, even after a possible response by the 
original DM. 
Sequential stability 
(SEQ) 
If all of a DM’s unilateral improvements are 
sanctioned by its opponents’ subsequent unilateral 
improvements. 
Never 
Limited-move 
stability ( hL ) 
A fixed number (h) of state transitions are 
contemplated; all DMs are assumed to act 
optimally by backward induction. 
Variable 
Strategic 
Non-myopic stability 
(NM) 
The limiting case of the limited-move stability as 
the number of state transition approaches . High 
 
 
Table 2. A sample matrix for pairwise comparison 
X 1Y  2Y  … tY  
1Y  11y  12y  … 1ty  
2Y  21y  22y  … 2ty  
… … … …  
tY  1ty  2ty  … tty  
 
 
Table 3. DMs and corresponding options 
Decision Makers Options 
Canadian government (CA) 
1. PPR: Expansion plan in the Port of Prince Rupert 
2. PMV: Expansion plan in the Port Metro Vancouver 
3. OP: Other ports, either west or east coast ports 
United States government  
(US) 
4. EX: Expansion plan for its own ports 
5. OS: Other solutions, such as shift cargo operations to off-peak hours 
Chinese government (CN) 6. MS: Develop own superport in Mexico 
Traders (TD) 
7. US: US gateway 
8. CA: Canadian gateway 
9. ME: Mexican gateway 
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Table 4. The pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from Canada’s standpoint 
 CA US CN TD Weight 
CA 1 1/5 3 5 0.204 
US 5 1 7 9 0.661 
CN 1/3 1/7 1 2 0.084 
TD 1/5 1/9 1/2 1 0.050 
 
 
Table 5. Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from Canada’s standpoint 
CA PPR PMV OP Weights 
PPR 1 1/3 3 0.268 
PMV 3 1 4 0.614 
OP 1/3 ¼ 1 0.117 
a) CA’s options 
 
US EX OS Weights 
EX 1 1 0.500 
OS 1 1 0.500 
b) US’s options 
 
TD US CA ME Weights 
US 1 1/7 1 0.111 
CA 7 1 7 0.778 
ME 1 1/7 1 0.111 
c) Traders’ options 
 
Table 6. The pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from US’s standpoint 
 CA US CN TD Weight 
CA 1 1/3 1/2 2 0.159 
US 3 1 3 4 0.510 
CN 2 1/3 1 2 0.226 
TD 1/2 1/4 1/2 1 0.104 
 
  
Table 7. Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from US’s standpoint 
CA PPR PMV OP Weights 
PPR 1 3 4 0.614 
PMV 1/3 1 3 0.268 
OP 1/4 1/3 1 0.117 
a) Canada’s options 
 
US EX OS Weights 
EX 1 2 0.667 
OS 1/2 1 0.333 
b) US’s options 
 
TD US CA ME Weights 
US 1 2 4 0.558 
CA 1/2 1 3 0.320 
ME 1/4 1/3 1 0.122 
c) Traders’ options  
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Table 8. The pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from China’s standpoint 
 CA US CN TD Weight 
CA 1 1/4 1/2 2 0.143 
US 4 1 2 6 0.526 
CN 2 1/2 1 2 0.240 
TD 1/2 1/6 1/2 1 0.092 
 
Table 9. Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from China’s standpoint 
CA PPR PMV OP Weights 
PPR 1 2 4 0.571 
PMV 1/2 1 2 0.286 
OP 1/4 1/2 1 0.143 
a) Canada’s options 
 
US EX OS Weights 
EX 1 1 0.500 
OS 1 1 0.500 
b) US’s options 
 
TD US CA ME Weights 
US 1 1/3 1/2 0.163 
CA 3 1 2 0.540 
ME 2 1/2 1 0.297 
c) Traders’ options 
 
 
Table 10. The pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from Traders’ standpoint 
 CA US CN TD Weight 
CA 1 1/2 2 1 0.224 
US 2 1 4 2 0.449 
CN 1/2 1/4 1 1 0.136 
TD 1 1/2 1 1 0.191 
 
Table 11. Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from Traders’ standpoint 
CA PPR PMV OP Weights 
PPR 1 3 2 0.550 
PMV 1/3 1 1 0.210 
OP 1/2 1 1 0.240 
a) Canada’s options 
 
US EX OS Weights 
EX 1 1 0.500 
OS 1 1 0.500 
b) US’s options 
 
TD US CA ME Weights 
US 1 1/2 2 0.311 
CA 2 1 2 0.493 
ME 1/2 1/2 1 0.196 
c) Traders’ options  
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Table 12. Overall ranking weights 
  
CA US CN TD 
Influence 
Power Options 
Actions/
States 
Influence 
Power Options
Actions/
States
Influence 
Power Options
Actions/
States
Influence 
Power Options 
Actions/
States
CA 
PPR 
0.204  
0.268  0.055  
0.159 
0.614 0.098 
0.143 
0.571 0.082 
0.224  
0.550  0.123 
PMV 0.614  0.125  0.268 0.043 0.286 0.041 0.210  0.047 
OP 0.117  0.024  0.117 0.019 0.143 0.020 0.240  0.054 
US 
EX 
0.661  
0.500  0.331  
0.510 
0.667 0.340 
0.526 
0.500 0.263 
0.449  
0.500  0.225 
OS 0.500  0.331  0.333 0.170 0.500 0.263 0.500  0.225 
CN MS 0.084  1.000  0.084  0.226 1.000 0.226 0.240 1.000 0.240 0.136  1.000  0.136 
TD 
US 
0.050  
0.111  0.006  
0.104 
0.558 0.058 
0.092 
0.163 0.015 
0.191  
0.311  0.059 
CA 0.778  0.039  0.320 0.033 0.540 0.050 0.493  0.094 
ME 0.111  0.006  0.112 0.012 0.297 0.027 0.196  0.037 
  
 
Table 13. Possible resolutions 
 84 98 
CA:    
1. PPR 1 1 
2. PMV 1 1 
3. OP 1 1 
US   
4. EX 0 1 
5. OS 1 0 
CN   
6. MS 1 1 
TD   
7. US 0 1 
8. CA 1 1 
9. ME 1 1 
 
Table 14. Status quo analysis for Canadian west coast congestion problem 
 Status 
Quo 
 Transitional states  Equilibrium
 56  49  63  98 
CA:           
1. PPR 0 → 1  1  1  1 
2. PMV 0 → 1  1  1  1 
3. OP 0 → 1  1  1  1 
US          
4. EX 1  1  1  1  1 
5. OS 1  1 → 0  0  0 
CN          
6. MS 0  0  0 → 1  1 
TD          
7. US 1  1  1  1 → 1 
8. CA 1  1  1  1  1 
9. ME 0  0  0  0 → 1 
 
